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Summary findings
Survey results in Poland indicate that  hard budgets and  *  Essential to the good performance  of state  industries
import  competition  can spur state  firms to adjust even  is an end to  open-ended  subsidies. Subsidies, rather  than
when privati7ation  lags behind. As they  examine the  helping firms  adjust, give rhem incentives to continue
underpinnings  of Polish reform, Pinto  and van.  their past be:bavior and destroy  any mechanism of
Wijnbergen  address the key question of why managers  control  other claim-holders  might have.
instigated  such  adjusrment.  '  - . Commercial  banks,  the  Polish  experience  shows,  can
They examine how corporate  ownership  and  control  be made to exercise governance  over stare firms.  -
influence  the behavior of state firms, as illuminated by  Without  effective takeover  mechanisms, withholding
thc following survey findings and conclusions:.  fiunds is their  most pow-erful instrument.  That  instrument
Contrary  to expecrations,  state  firms took painful  is made powerless if firms, pressured to adjusr by banks.
adjustment  measures. Enterprise managers  firmly  can turn to the government  themselves. Banks themselves
believed that privatization was coming. This belief led  started to respond appropriately  - and to play a
them to manage better,  not worse; a private-sector-based  powerful  role in disciplining enterprises - only afrer
economy  means a marker for managers  and a premium  their own governance  and controllincentive  mechanisms
on skilled management.  had been reformed as part of the banking  reforms  of the
* The excess wage tax (the much-criticized  Popiwek"  fourth quarter  of 1991.
scheme) did restrain  wage-setting behavior,  judging from
the wage-setting equations  presented  by Pinto and van
Wiinbergen'
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When Eastern Europe opened up in 1990. there was widespread  agreement that the existing State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were doomed. Some claimed they were actually  value-subtracting  and would
be wiped ouE  by trade liberalization (McKinnon  (1993)). While this extreme view had little basis in fact.
most would have agreed with the view expressed in van Wijnbergen (1991): "  After the crumbling of
central authorty that  used to exercise both ownership and control. ownership  of -SOEs  remains  ineffective
and control diffuse.  ( ... )  [With changes in ownership announced  but  no  t  implemented managers and
workers councils alike have every incenive to decapitalise  the enterprise and increase its debts".  Similar
misgivings were expressed in Lipton.and Sachs (1990 a.b) and Frvdman and Wellisz (1991).
While this may be a reasonable  description  of what is now going on in theFormer  Soviet Union.
the SOEs in most of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) have done much better than predicted. Poland grew
faster than any country in Europe  in 1993. at least partly because its state enterprise sector pumin  a robust
performance after the decline in 1990 and 1991. Eixports  to the West shot up. mostly because SOEs
successfully sought new export markets after the coliapse in interal  demand in 1990 and the demise of
CMEA trade in 1991: and industrial production. almost 70 percent of which came from SOEs, grew at
4 percent in [992 and 5.6 percent in 1993  (GUS Statistical Bulletin, various issues) with prospects of 6-7
percent for 1994.' This raises what is in our view the most intriguing question  posed by Poland's growth
experience: how come  the state sector has defied the odds and not collapsed?  It is no surprise that the new
private sector is growing at.breakneck speed: but given the incentive  problems and poor governance in
the SOEs. why did the disaster that was widely predicted in the early reform years not materialize?
There is remarkably  little empirical work to base an answer on. Most  of the survey work has been
-focused on the rapidly growing private sector (cf Webster (1992) for interesting examples). While that
focus is understandable. it is  no great surprise that private enterprises are growing fast.  difficult
circumsnances  notwithstnding. The service sector, which is where most of privateenterprises arestarring
up. was largely neglected  under the communist regimes. by and large requires little up front capital outlay
and faces a huge demand. Much more intriguing is the question why, given the incentive problems and
lack of corporate control mechanisms rightly pointed out in the early literamre.,  state industries seem to
be recovering  in much of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This is the question we address-
Aggregate  statistics do show a shrinking  state sector  in  1993.  This is however pardy  because  of privatization  and
pardy because of asset sales by SOEs to private operators.  There is  a growing body of survey evidence shDWing
that  SOEs  are  turning  around.  See  Hume  and  Pinto  (1993)  for  examples.Rather than cover all of CEE. we take an in-depth look at the most spectacular  example, Poland'2
The first author conducted a series of firm-level interviews over 1991 and 1992  while at the World Bank
-office in Warsaw. The resulting panel data set sheds a fascinating light on this ouestion3;-.the  answers
have, in our view. great significance  for those countries that are now where Poland was three years ago.
Pinto et alii (1993) provide survey results indicating that hard budgets and import competition
can spur ste  firms  to adjust even when privatizaEion  lags behind.  Our discussion goes to the key
question of why mianagers  instigated such adjustments as we examine the micro-underpinnings  of the
Polish reform.  We. examine the influence of corporate ownership and control on SOE behavior as
illuminated by four key results from the survey evidence First, contrarv to expectations, SOEs did take
painful adjustnent  measures: second. we present both econometric evidence and direct survey results
indicatinz that the excess wage tax restained wage setting behavior. Third. we show that banks played
a powerful role in disciplining enterprises, but only did so after their own governance was reformed in
the banking reforms of end-1991. Finally  we present intriguing and encouraging  evidence  on the incentive
effects for  managers of  fumtre privatization plans.  Shleifer (1993) questioned whether the budget
constraint imposed on Polish enterprises was indeed hard.  This paper provides importan  insighLs  into
the hardening of the budget constraint and the credibility of the re'orms as seen through the eyes of state
firm managers.
In what follows we first document the adjustment that has taken place in the SOE sector in Poland
drawing on the survev evidence (section.2). In section 3 we provide econometric evidence on the extent
to which the various claim holders (the government. banks and suppliers) have exercised governance.
Section 4 directlv addresses  the issue of management  incentives: was there more than direct.pressure from
claim holders that led managers to restructure firms and focus on efficiencv?  And Section.5 concludes.
2  State Enterurise Adjustment in Poland
In this section. we first present a sketch of the background against which the SOEs functioned
(Section 2.1)- the second part of the section documents the adjustment  that has taken place in the SOEs
drawing on our survey evidence (Section 2.2).
An early  paper  on incentive  issues  in the Polish context is Frvdman and Wellisz  1:991).  Other  relevant
referencesare  Dabrowski  et alii  (1991): Pinto et alii (1991).Schaffer  (1992).  Fan and Schaffer  (1993)  and in
particular  Gomulka  (1993).
See Pinto et alii (1993) for a detailed  description  of the survey  and'a  preliminary  analysis:  a short  description  of
ffie enterprises  covered  is given  in Annex  1 to this paper.3.
2.1  Back-ground
For  those unacquainted  with the details of the Polish  reform,  we summnarize  here  the four  key
events  impacting  state  firms  and their timing.  The first  was the  "big bang"  itself,  which  occurred  on
January  1.  1990: the second  was the collapse  of the  trading  arrangements  between the  former  Soviet
Union and its satellite states  (CMEA trade) at the start of 1991; the third  was the first devaluation  of the
Polish  zloty  during  the reforms  in May  1991 (almost -17 moniths after the big bang) and  the switch  to a
crawling peg inOctober  l991;  the fourth were the banking reforms of end-1991, whereby thecomnercial
banks spun  off from the National  Bank of Poland (the socialist era mono-bank) were brought under direct
control  of the Ministry  of Finance and a scheme for dealing with  bad loans was initiated.  A thumbnail
sketch of evolving  enterprise  issues is as follows:  in 1990,  the big surprise  was that SOEs did not go
bankrupt,  in spice of the  rigors  of hard budgets and  liberalized  imports  that accompanied  the big bang,
which led to  a big sales decline.  Following  the collapse  of CMEA  trade  in  1991. the enterprise  sector
went  deep  into  recession  and  Poland  seemed  headed  for  a  high-inflation  collapse;  but  following  the
changes  in the  exchange  arrangements  mentioned  above  a  sales  recovery  was observed  in late  1991,
which  has prett  much  continued unabated since.  Throuehout.  what exactly  trianspired at the firm-level
.has been a mystery.'
Polish SOEs were starting  from non-marker initial conditions  of no price comnpetition,  production
targets  and state distribution  systems.  The 'big  bang" substantially  freed prices,  raised real interest rates
to  ex ante  positive  levels  and  introduced  import  competition  by  slashing  tariffs  and  making  the  zloty
convertible  for  trade  and  internal.portfolio  transactions.  Overmight.  SOEs  had  to  deal  with  a  new
economic  system without  prior training.  and managers felt overwhelmed  by  the kaleidoscope of changes
they  had to deal with
With zero unemployment. in socialist Poland, hence overstaffed  SOEs,  one would expect the hard
budgets and  import competition  to induce labor shedding.  Further.  since pre-reform  relative  prices were
irrelevant  and quality  did not matter in the old.  scarcity-plagued  regime.  one would  expect  companies
to focus on  cost efficiency  and product-mix  improvements  in the new environment.  Lastly, with macro
stringency  leading  to depressed  domestic  demand  and  shrinking  real wages  (partly  engineered  by  the
excess wages tax).  SOEs could improve their chances of survival by exporting.  We examine these aspects
of adjustment  in Section  2.2.
Details  on  these  key.events  may  be  found  in Pinto  et alii  (1991.  1993)  and  Schaffer  (1992).  Balcerowicz  (1993)
and  Bruno  (1992)  discuss  factors  impinging  on  the  design  of  the  refonns.4
2.2  Sroie Enterprise Adjustment
The adjustment  evidence  presented here is based on a direct survey of 75 large SOEs picked from
the Lisma  500. Poland's version of the Fortune 500.  Our reason for restricting attention to large state
companies  is that these companies were expected  to be the most resistant to reform. The enterprises were
visited twice, once in mid-1991 and once in mid-1992.  The data obtained cover the period June 1989-
June 1992, six months before the big bang of January 1. 1990, and 30 months into the reforms. The 64
enterprises responding to  the repeat survey were classified into three groups depending upon their
financial performance in 1992:  AAA connoting positive retained earnings after paying all taxes; AA
connoting positive pre-income tax profit but negative retained earnings; and A connoting negative pre-
income tax profit, i.e., loss-making  enterprises. 5 There tumed out to be 31 AAA firms. 8 AA firms and
25 A firms.  We focus on the AAA and A firms in our attempts to discover differences in response and
the impact of governance. Annex A contains details on sample selection and the data collected.
Labor Shedding and Unit Labor Costs
Table 1 shows that in the sample as a whole, labor was reduced by a phenomenal 27 percent
:  between December 1989 and June 1992. What is even more interesting is that the least profitable firns
shed the most labor. This makes economic sense, but clearly contradicts the standard view on the modus
operandi of state enterprises in post-commumist  Europe.
Table 1:  Index of Employment (September 1989= 100)
__________|  Dec-89  June-90  Dec-90  June-91  Dec-91  XJtue-92
AAA  [L01.7  95.1  93.4  87.4  -84.4  -79.4
AA  99.7  98.7  95.2  87.3  78.5  76.5
A  100 1  95.9  88.5  81.9  74.0  67.1
TOTAL  10.8  -95.8  91.3  84.7  78.8  73-2
Real sales also fell after the big bang in 1990. There was an immediate and abrupt contraction
in output and thereafter some recovery after mid-year. but 1990  ended with a 12 percent decline in GDP.
s  The standard  way of classiiring  enterprises  is by industrial sector.  i.e..  chemicals,  engineering,  food processing,
etc..  but this  is not verV illuminating when studying  adjustnent.5
For  the  sample  firms,  sales  dropped  sharply  in  the  beginning  of  1990.  but have  exhibited  different
patterns  since.  Sales of AAA firms started  rebounding  in April  [991 and have been on an uptrend  since.
- But sales of A firms have been  in decline  throughout.
Labor  shedding  has salvaged  productivity  somewhat.  Between September  1989 and June  1992,
AAA  firms  suffered  a marginal decline  of 3 percent  in productivity,  -while it plummeted  40  percent for
A  firms.  These differences  are reflected  in unit labor costs.  Real wages rose rapidly  in the last quarter
of  1989,  as firms believed  year-end  wages would form  the basis  for wage increases after  the big bang;
but there  was  also a boom in sales, keeping unit labor  costs in check.'  The biW  bang brought  with  it ai
big jump  in materials  and energy prices and a three-fold increase  in interest rates,  which-ranged from 50
to  72 percent  for the month  of January  1990 alone.  Firms  had no option but to freeze  nominal  wages.
Real wages plunged,  and  so did unit labor costs.  Subsequendly, these rose as real wages recovered;  but
have  been  going down since  mid-1991  as  labor cuEs have  coninued  in the face of stabilizing  or rising
sales.  AAA  firms have done much  better  than:A  firms on this  score,  as Figure  I attests.
Lkit Ld.bor  Cost A,iA  Unit Labor CoSt AA  Lhiit Labor CoSt A
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Figure 1: Unit  Labor Costs.
Cost Control and Product Mix
Under the auspices of CMEA trade that existed among the Soviet Union and its satellite states.
Poland was a -nec imnporter  of energy and raw materiahi and an  exporter of electromechanical and
consumer goods that did not meet world quality standards. SOEs benefited  from the persistence of CMEEA
trade in 1990. which to some eent  cushioned the price imnpact  of the big bang and permitted a'slower
6Thtis  boom. and  the hyperinflacion  during the Last  quarter of  1989 is ascribcd  toD  a spending  spree  by households  in
anticipation  or  the price rises expected  at the start of the reform program in 1990.6
increase  of materials and energy prices.
7 As Table 2 demonstrates.  all three groups of finns  had roughly
the same level of energy and materials costs in 1990: the price impact of the collapse of the CMEA
(switching from administered transferable ruble prices for energy and raw materials prices in 1990 to
international dollar prices in 1991) shows up in the numbers for the first half of 1991 for AAA firms.
By the first half of 1992, both AAA and A groups exhibit increased efficiency in materials and energy
use, even compared to the implicitly subsidized numbers of  1990. In fact the decline in the share of
materials and energy costs even in the face of a clear relative price increase of in particular energy
(relative  to  output prices) is  impressive testimony to  the  extent of  adjustment that  took  place..
Interestingly, A firns  on average have no difficulty covering variable costs, suggesting that their travails
- .~~~.
may be due more to excess labor and the debt overhang, and that with downsizing and restructuring,
these firms could have potential.
Table 2: Materials and Energy Costs to Sales (%)
1990  1991  1991  1992
(1-6)  - (1-12)  (1-()
AAA  52  58  50  45
AA  47  60  61  50
A  48  47  45  39
When asked to  rate the importance of product mix changes as a factor stimulating increased
production on a zero-to-five scale, AAA firms averaged 3.2. while A firms averaged 1.5.
Exporr  Behavior
One of the stellar achievements  of the Polish economy in 1990 was the huge increase in hard
currency exports to the west. Hard currency exports grew by some 40 percent at the same time that total
industrial sales fell by 23 percent and CMEA exports shrank by 10 percent. These aggregate numbers
strongly suggest a diversion of sales from the home and CMEA markets to the west, indicating that SOEs
7  For example. at the strt  of the Gulf Crisis in 1990. Poland was importing  oil from the Soviet Union at 5 3 per
- barrel  compared t  a world price of 525-  Table 5 in Kharas (1991) contains other telling examples of implicit
subsidies.7
were nimble-footed enough to quickly re-orient the direction of their sales.
While this re-orientation implied  a certain adjustment. it did nor necessarily mean that exporting
firms had adjusted better in other ways, such as cost control, labor shedding  or.new product development.
The 1990 hard currency boom.coincided with the persistence of CMEA trade with its implicit input
subsidies. It was the most prominent-  in the chemicals and metallurgical sectors, which benefited frorm
cheap energy (gas) and materials (iron ore). The liberalization of trade with the west combined with a
big depreciation of the zloty/dollar rate compared to the zloty/transferable rate vastly increased the
relative profitability of securing inputs from the east and selling to the west.
This can be seen from a simplified profit function for exports to the west: profit ($) per unit of
exports  p. - pm  (rn/E), where p 1 is the (sticky)  dollar price of unit exports to the west. pm  is the (sticky)
ruble price of imports. m is the volume of imported CMEA inputs per unit of exports (fixed  by short-run
technology) and E is the implied TR/dollar rate. E went from 2.97 TR/dollar in 1989 to 4.52 TRIdollar
in 1990. greatly increasing profits.
It is therefore tempting to believe that firms that could, based on existing  technology and product
quality, diverted sales en masse to the west in 1990 without waiting for the 1991  CMEA collapse. This
view was tested by asking the managers of the chemicals  and metallurgical firms, the two sectors where
the 1990 export boom had been the most prominent. the following  questions: First, did the hard currency
export boom to the west consist of the identical products sold earlier in the home and CMEA markets,-
or of new products?  Second. did firms that could, divert sales immediately  in 1990  without waiting for
the 1991 CMEA collapse? The results shown in Table 3 indicate that the answer to both questions was
a resounding "yes"- Certainly, managers took the initiative and sold to the west. and this is commendable,
even though they confirmed that the products were essentially the same and that implicit CMEA input
subsidies made a big difference.  The following answers were obtained:Table 3:  [990 Export Boom
Answer  % of Total Exports
l___________________  _j  |  - -Involved"
The same product  91
Diversion  in 1990  1  89
IJ  Total exports refer to the 1990  expons  of the firms  polled.
Investment Behavior
An enduring fear has been that worker-controlled  SOEs would decapicalize  companies  by paying
out all surpluses:  in wages. This fear has been justified by appealing.  to. the governance of companies
(worker-controlled  firms with "no advocate for capital") and the assumed myopia of workers.
We set up  a  direct  test for  decapitalization, defined simply as  investment being less than
depreciation. What is the relationship between  investment.  depreciation  and profitability at the firm-level?
Do more profitable firms invest more?  And in cases where investment does exceed depreciation, does
profitability play a positive role?  Or is there no obvious link with profitability? If more profitable firms
do invest more relative to depreciation. then one can conclude that any observed decapitalization  is really
a part of the normal adjustrnent one would expect to the change in economic regime. rather than a
deliberate squandering of state assets. The following  equation was estimated:
Inv/Dep =  f(7r)
where  Inv is irnvestment,  dep is depreciation and 'r  is. profit margin. To see whether one can.find
changing patterns as incentives changed. we ran separate cross-section regressions for 1989, 1990, and
1991.
INV
DEP''Table 4
1989  1990  1991
Estimate  t stat  -Estimate  t staL  Estimate  t stat
a  :  8.346  3.76  0.936  2.297  LOO1  7.28
/3  ::  0  :p:  -10.29  -1.21-  2.422  1.278  1.590  1.92
The regressions sketch an  interesting pattern: while investment (scaled by depreciation) is a
negative function of profitability in the last year of the old regime (1989), the coefficient on profitability
turns positive in 1990 and 199  1. And in the last year the relevant coefficient is almost signific-1n  at the
standard 5%9D  test size (1.92 instead of 1.96). This provides an indication ti  justment did take place
in sensible directions: expansion took place in the more profitable firms.
Wage Setting Behavior
Did wages consume  all the surplus, or are there signs of restraint?  Figure 2 shows  .the share of
wage costs (basic wages plus payroll taxes and social insurance contributions) in a measure of  gross
value-added (GVA, equal to profits before tax plus wage costs plus depreciation).
Wages/Gross Value Added AAA  Wages/Gross Vldue  Added AA  Wages/Gros Value  Added A
0.1  "  l*  :r  0.1-  ---  !  -i---  I  0  ;--<----  I  -2< Sall-S..  -I
-Figure  2:  Wages/Gross  Value  Added  -O  So1001'IN  li5  5;II~~
- ~~In  interpreting the graphs, it should be remembered that GVA was artificiEally  high to start with
owing to implicit CMEA subsidies in 1990. Further, there was a huge compression in wages after the
2  2
big bang to offset higher input costs and interest rates. After the fear of bankruptcy had subsided around:
mid-1990 and macro policy was loosened,:wages grew rapidly, partly tO comypensate  for the initial
aj.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 10
shrinkage  in the real wage.8 NWfhat  the graphs  show is that after rising.  the share of wages stabilizes  for
AAA  firms  at around  23 percent  and actually  falls  for A  Firms after consuming  virrtally  all the  GVA
initially.  For  AAA firms.  wages were far from consuming all of GVA.  The unprofitable  A firms came
close  to this:  but this was more due to the compression  of GVA than  prodigality  in setting wages.  The
rise  in the ratio of wages to GVA  in A  firms took  place in spite  of sharp  cuts in labor  (recall Table  1)
and  wage payments that  were well below  those in AAA  firms (Table  5).
Table  5:  Measures  of Wage Restraint
Category  1990  1991  :1992
Average  monthly  wage.  AAA  1060  1779  2196
(thousands  of zlotysl  worker)  AA  1204  1464  2004
A  933  1517  1802
PPWW  to Disposable  Cash  (whole  AAA  9.8  18.5  -7-9
period)  (%)  AA  12.1  20.0  1.9
A  7.1  -11.5  -4.0
PPWW  per  worker  (whole period-  AAA  3655  6500  1635
thousands  of zlotys)  AA  5675  4740  219
A  1319  1518  256
Another  measure  of restraint,  shown  in  Table  5,  is based  on the excess  wage tax.  The  excess
wage  tax.  better  klnown by  its Polish  acronym.  PPWW,  was adopted  as  one  of the nominal  anchors
designed  to kill hyperinflation  at the start of the reform  in January  1990. It was designed as a punishing,
progressive  tax on wage increases above norm wages. The highest  marginal rate was initially set at 500
percent,  but was subsequently  lowered  to 400 percent and then 300 percent. Table  5 shows the share  of
the  excess  wage  tax  payment  in  disposable  cash.  defined  as profits  before  tax  minus  income  tax  -
S  Discussions of wage setting in 1990 are contained,  in Pinto (1992) and Schaffer (1992).dividends  plus  depreciation.'  The facr that a  relatively  small  share of disposable  cash was devoted  to
PPWW  (the  table  is based  on  PPNVW  accrued)  is a  definiLe sign  of wage  restraint.  The  table  is also
interesting -in that most PPWW payments were incurred  by profitable  firms.  PPWW payments increased
sharply  in  1991  (but not that dramaticallv  in real terms  - inflation  was about 70%  percent)- This  may
partly be due to the shift from a wage bill to an average wage norm in 199  1. which meant that as workers
were shed.  firms  would. have to pay the PPWW even- if the total wage bill remained  constart.  In 1992.
PPWW per  worker  fell sharply.
Social Assets
Social assets  (hospitals. schools, football stadiums,  worker housing) have always.been an integral.
part of socialist  firms.  The onset of mark-et reforms  required  that  the financial  and managerial  burden
stemrmiing  from  such assets  be addressed-
During the first round of visits in mid-1991.  managers complained  bitterly about they saw as the
overwhelming  burden  of social assets.  No solution seemed to be in sight. It was therefore  natural to probe
during  the  second  round  of visits  whether  anv  solutions  had  appeared.  The  contrast  was  refreshing0
Managers seemed  more  comfortable with the problem.  In most cases, the ideal solution would be to give
away the .assets; but this would require establishing  ownership  and possibly  paying gift taxes.  Unable to
do  this.  various  forms  of cost  recovery  had been  developed:  schools  were  handed  over  to  the  local
authorities;  cafeterias  had been converted  into showrooms:  sports stadiums  were  offered for  use to the
city.  which  picks  up  the  operating  cost:  vacation  resorts  and  wvorker hotels  commenced  commercial
operation-  The big  problem  of worker  housing had  been reduced  as controlled  rents  and  utilities  were
raised.  Managers  had formulated'several  potential solutions  to the worker housine  problem.  which they
were beginning  to- voice. Thus.  while social assets still  remained  on the books and therefore  continued
to be a problem.  it was a problem being active9y  addtessed:
Distnibution
The  state distribution  netvork  collapsed  with the  onset of market  reforns.  creating  a gigantic
problem  for SOBs  used to producing  without having to bother  about sales or marketing-  Much progress
has been made  in this crucial  area.  Nearly  all the sample SOEs had set up  markleting departments.  The
The  notion  of  disposable  cash  is  closely  tied  to  the  cash  constraint  indicator  derived  below  in  the context  of  bank
borrowings.- . - - - ~~~~~12
iumber two position. usually  given to a production  person. was now reserved for the sales or finance
director  instead.
SOEs have begun establishing direct contact with the ultimate consumers or with retailers. ID
Metallurgy,  managers reported that in 1992 over 80%  of sales were direct deliveries to the.ultimate  user,
in electromachinery  only slightly less. Two years  earlier ste3l  mills had only a few customers,  sometimes
Dne,  who would take care of the whole distribution process. with the producer fully isolated-  from the
market.-
In consumer  goods  sectors such  as food  processing  and light  manumfacuring,  a simlar process  is
mider  way. Over half of output is sold directly to retailers  to avoid wholesalers' commissions  and contacts
with  often unviable  and small parners. The best firms are building  up their own networks  of reliable
iistributors  for wholesaling  and storage, sometimes  supplemented  with facmory-sponsored  reail shops..
In 1990, over 90 perent  of exports by the sample firms were through state-owned foreign trade
ompanies  (FTCs).  Dissatisfied  by high  conmmissions  and  sometimes  inadequate  service,  SOEs  have  found
dternatives.  By 1992, FTCs accounted  for just over 50 percent of the exports of  the sample firms: 27
percent was sold directly to western clien  and 16 percent through new private agents.
Ywmnar'  o  rA4i#=usr
The preceding evidence shows that SOEs have been willing  to take  painful measures to  mprove
hieir long-nm profitability. The most significant among these has been labor-shedding. The data aLsc
support the view that efficiency in materials  and energy usage is up, while tends  in unit labor costs are
Mcouraging. The more successful firms have experienced a revival of sales and point to the mportance
f product mix changes. As early as 1990, SOEs proved that they could quickly sense and take advantage
Xf  profit opporunities. captured by the immediate  and large diversion of sales from the home and CMEA
arkets  to the west. The presing  problem of social assets has also begun to be addressed in a convicing
manner, and marketing, the Achilles' heel of SOEs. is improving. These adjusments fly in the face of
:arly predictions regarding SOE behavior, which were based on the view that managers and workers
.would  sauander stae  assets and did not have the incentive or exeriise  to restcucture. We now turn to:13  -''
3  What made SOEs adiust?
There was every reason to expect destructive  rnangement  behavior in Poland's SOEs after the
collapse of communism in 1990. With Central authoritY  in disarray and in the absence of a centralized
treasury, the Government as equity owner was unlikely to be interested in or capable of,management
control. And corporate debt was typically held in newly-created banks with no experience of Western
style banking behavior. Yet  by  and  large the state sector has belied all  predictions and adjusted
remarkably well to changing circumstances. We saw in the previous section that a survey of SOEs
conducted over the period 1990-1993  shows adjustment patterns and management  behavior remarkably
in line with what one would expect from profit oriented forward looking entrepreneurs.
This immediately raises the question of why managers behaved in the way they did in spite of
the absence of regular mechanisns of corporate control and without any a priori obvious incentives to
do so. Did any of the formal owners force such behavior onto management, and if so why and how? Or
did management respond to incentives that were not obvious to outside observers at the ouaset?'T  The
answers to these questions are of obvious importance o the design and implementation  of enterprise and-
financial sector reform programs..
The starting point of the answer is the ownership strucmre of the enterprises involved- Except
for  three  privatized  SOEs.  all enterprises  in the sample  are statewned,  and only a subset  had already.
been corporatized. Thus the Government was the equity owner, de jure for the corporatized enterprises.
and de facto for the rest. At the same time.  the government also is the senior debt holder in most
enterprises through the existence of tax arrears. Since loss-making  enterprises by definition do not pay
Income tax, those arrears were largely incurred on dividend and Popiwek tax liabilities.
inom  :a  Ehs  arer  wer  -in.u
to  An early  discussion  of incentive issues  is contained  in Frydman  and Wellisz  (1991).  A  more recent  discussion  of
corporat  governance and privatization  is contained in Frydman  and Rapaczynski  (1994)..14
Table 6:  Funding  Structure  of AAA and  A firms
. . AAA-Firms  A Firms  I
SOURCE  1990  1991  1992  1990  1991  1992.
Working  Capital  Loans  192.8  115.7  |105.1  95.8  56.2  46.9
Investment  Loans  35.8  49.3  54.7  25.4  18.4  19.6
Capitalized  Interest  0.2  2.5  S.6  1.3  1.8  1X9
Tax Arrears  11.4  10.4  15.7  7.5  15.4  24.0
Interfirm  Borrowine  -140-1  -77.8  -84.1  -30.0  8.2  7.6
*  100.0  I  100.0  1100.  100.0} I1000  100.0
The  next most  important  debt holders  (in terms of seniority)  were commercial  banks  (cf Table
6. the items Working  Capital  Loans.  rnvestment Loans  and Capitalized Interest).  With such a dominant
position  on the firms7 liability side. commercial  banks were clearly in a position  to exercise  control both
direcdy  and  through  their  abilitv  to  grant  or  deny  new  loans.  And  finally  cash-rich  enterprises
accumulated  claims  on  cash-poor ones through  interenterprise  arrears  (LEAs). In wha; follows  we  will
investigate  control  group by control group  the extent to which they played an active role in establishing
enterprise  governance."
- Table 6 shows that AAA firms reduced  working capital loans but also inter-firin  lending (interfirm  borrowing =
payab[Ls  minus receivables).  Capitalized interest  goes  up. but  so do investment  loans (capitalization was.permitted
only for such loans).  Tax arrears go up slightly, but not as a percentage of taxes due.  Hence- good firms began
monitoring accounts receivable. For A firms. the fall in working capital loans was accompanied  by a switch from
being an inter firm lender to an inter firm borrower and  ax arrears  increased direefold.15
3.1  Thze  Government  and Corporate  Governance
There is no sign of the.governnent  exercising control according  wo  cenral  principles as azn  equity
holder the way for example the Mexican government took control of its state enterprises in 1986. This
was probably due tO the absence of a centralized treasurv function: SOEs that were not yet corporatized
remained under the control of their respective  line mrinistries. Corporate control could also have bean
exercised through other channels. however:  we list three. First, the government  could through open-ended
subsidies or bail-outs have undemuned  efforts  by ocher claim holders to establish corporate governance.
Second. the government through its tax claims became a debt holder and could force adjustment in
enterprises: and third, the goi.ernment could and did set general rules and general incentive schemes to
induce  responsible enterprise behavior. In the Polish context. the third category consisted  of an elaborate
scheme to induce wage moderation. the effectiveness of which has been questioned by many (eg.
Coricelfi e.a. (1992)).
Subsidkes  Clearly.  unconditional and open-ended subsidies eliminate any  chance of other debt
holders to control managers since management  can simply ask for more subsidies when faced with threats
of fimding cut-offs bv. for example. banks. Thus open-ended subsidies destroy any chance of anybody
establishing  corporate governance. On this score. Polish performance  was exemplary: indusil  subsidies
were sharply reduced over the period 1989-92 (cf Table  :  what subsidies remained were directed to
areas other than manufacturing (e.g.. the railwavs and housing). The absence of open-ended subsidies as
a last resort source of funding created the opportunity for other claim holders to exercise control.
Table 7: Government Subsidies to Economic Units
Zloty trillion  1988  1989  1990  1991  19
Total Expenditure  8-4  29.6  L72.2  241.9  381.9
Subsidies  3.3  9-7  32.9  22 0  _8
Subs/Total Exp. ()39  33  19  9  5
Source: GUS Statistical Yearbook 1991 (Table 4 p. 231).  1993 (Table 2 p. 233). Data are noE  fUlly
comparable because Voivodships (local government authorities) are included from 1991 onwards in the
Govermment  Budget data: but the trend is obvious.16
Ta  Arrears  The trade opening in  1990 immediately put pressure on price-cost margins in Polish
industrv. Type A firns  were by and large most affected  by import competition and suffered the largest
relative price declines as pre-reform prices adjusted to international levels (Pinto e.a.  (1993)). And as
profits fell. payments discipline disappeared. Table 8 shows the results of a regression linking between
enterprise profit margin and tax arrears.
TAXARR.= x+PPRFI+4ei
Table 8
|_______}  91990  1991  1992
1-  Eimte  t-stac  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  i-satt
a  j 0.089  3.473  0.269  - 5991  0_229  6-394
_  ._a  - j-0-240  -2.006  -1-205  4.478  -0.521  -3I40
TAXARR: Tax arrears as a percentage of taxes due:
PIRF:  profit margin =  pre-tax profits/sales.
Table 8 shows how tax arrears were largely a response to sagging profits  With tax arrears
available as a way of relieving liquidiy shortages. corporate governance  was clearly underniined. But this
could do only limited damage to imposing hard budget  constraints: after all there is a natral  limit to  amx
arrears as an escape  from budget constraints: tax arrears cannot exceed tax liabilities. Low profits meant
there were no tax liabilities  under corporate income  tax in the loss mnaking  firms: also. loss making firms
exercised more wage restraint than profitable firms so the PPWW liability was limited too; arrears were
largely incurred on the miniimum  asset tax to which Polish SOEs were subject (this tax goes under the
name "dividend  cax").  So the conclusion is that tax arrears did some damage to corporate governance;
but the extent was limited by the fact that tax arrears cannot exceed tax liabilities.
The Popzivek  Scheme (PPWW) The PPWW was a tax-based incomes policy based on nonus for wage
increases (cf Pinto e.a. (1993) and Pinto (1992) for a detailed description). Wage increases in excess of
the norm led to tax liabilities that increased sharply with the size of the transgression. The effectiveness
of this policy has been questioned  by many, partially because  of the existence  of tax arrears  see Coricelli-17
e.a.  (1992).  If the PPWWS  was  in fact  incurred but not paid.  it obviously  would not have  a moderating
influence on wage settlements that managers granted.  Whether the PPWW scheme in fact acted as a break
nn  wage  settlements  is obviously  a  hard question  to answer categorically;  we do not know  what wage
settlementis would have been without  this scheme.  But the evidence from our survey does not support  the
critical  view of observers  like Coricelli  e.a.  (1992).
Consider  first the wage regression  presented  below  (Table 9)- The equation  estimates  quarterly
percentage  wage increases in excess of peTTnissible  percentage  norm wage increases (defined exogenously
under  indexation)  as a function of the percentage  increase  in real value  added during  the same  quarter.
the real increase  in bank credit  to the enterprise  granting the wage increase-  and, importantly,  to the real.
stock of ouEstandirn PPWNW  liabilities  (proxied  by the cumulative  excess of the wage bill over the norm
since Januarv  1 of the ongoing  calendar  year  upto  the  start  of the  quarter,  divided  by  employment  to
eliminate  spurious  firm  size  effects).  Significance  of  the  latter  variable  (labeled  LTX  IEMPL  irI  the
regression)  would  indicate that the PPWVW  scheme  indeed did contribute  to wage  restraint.  In addition
to results  for the whole period.  Table  9 below splts  the sample period into to parts. the break point being
1991.4.  when  banking reform  was introduced  (described  below during  the discussion  on banks).
The results  are  strong.  Increases  in the  available  surplus,  as measured  by  the  increase  in real
value  added,  did  not  have  a si2nificanc  impact  in either  period  nor  in the p_riod  as  a whole.  Increases  in
the real value of available bank credit  gets a positive  and significanr  cefficient  in the period prior  to the
banking  reform  in 91.4 but switches  sign and  is almost  significant  at  conventional  levels  from  1991.4
onwards.  This  confirms  the  suspicion  often  expressed  that  there  was a  wage-credit  link  prior  to  the
banking  reforms  and  is one  indication  (more  will  follow  in Section  3.2)  that  banks  simply  provided.
relatively  open-ended  funding before these  reforms  but tightened  up significantly  afterwards.
(WPC,-  WPC)  =a  +  p  l(LT)h  i+p,GVAPCZ.+  pf3BBPCi 2 +eie.
EMPL18
Table 9
_90.2-92.2  90.2-9  1.  3'  91.4-92.2'
Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  E-stat
,  _-71259  -4.850  -13.909  4.306  4.399  -2.258
(32  0.003  0-437  0.020  1.267  -0.003  -0.364
33  0.030  L  1645  0.042  1.212  -0.184  -1.918
WPC:  growth rate of the quarterly wage bill:
WPC':  growvth  rate of the quarterlv wage bill according to the PPWW norm:
LTX  cumulative tax liability under the PPWW scheme (cumulated from Januarv 1
of the ongoing calendar year up to the start of the quarter):
EMPL: average employment in current quarter
GVAPC: growth rate of quarterly real gross value added.
BBPC:  growth rate of quarterly real bank-  borrowing.
Most important for the subject of this section are the results on the significance of the PPWW
scheme. Outstanding PPWW liabilities exercised a strong negative influence  over wage settements: the,
coefficient is negative and highly significant  both over th-e  whole sample  period and over the sub-samples
before and after the commercial bank reforms (90.2-91.3 and 91.4-92.2). This contradicts much of the
academic discussion on the PPwW (which has to date not made any formal attempt at testing the often
strong conclusions on the effectiveness  of the PPWW-).
The second piece of evidence  is of a more qualitative nature. First of all. the firms with the most.
tax arrears (type A firms) were incurring the least PPWW liabilities since they exercised more wage
restraint than more profitable firms, as we sawv  in Table 5. This undermines the criticism that because
of the possibility of going into tax arrears the PPWW had little impact. Not surprisingly, when asked
whether removal of the PPWW scheme would lead to higher average wage levels. only 40% of type A
firms answered yes and the rest no. Of the type AAA firms, on the other hand, 80% expected higher
wages without the PPWW scheme. This difference is understandable given our finding of more wage
restmint in type A firms: in a number of them the PPWW liabilities trigger was in fact not reached,
leading them to sav that removing the trigger would not have made much of a difference. The fact that
no less than 80% of type AAA respondents saw the PPWW as an effective constraint strongly suggests
that the PPWW did have a moderating impact.19,
Table 10: By How Much Would You Raise  Wages Without The PPWW?
Inmreasc  A (no.  of firmsj  AAA (no. of finms)  j
64-10%  2-  5
11 -15  %  4  3
: 16 -20  %  2  7
20-30%  3
>30%  3
Table I0 quantifies this further. It indicates  by how much firns  expected wages to raise wages
in the absence of the PPWW scheme. The cable again indicates that managers saw the PPWW as an
effective restraint  on wage behavior.  The conclusiGn seems clear  the PPWW did have an impact on wage
developments: wage inflation in Poland would have been significantly higher without it.
Summing up  The overall assessment is somewhat mixed. There is no indication char  the government
as shareholder acted directly to chan,ge  management behavior for tie  better, and the possibility of tax
arrears undermined efforts to impose hard budget constraints. But this damage was limited by the facts
that tax arrears cannot exceed tax liabilities  and that firrns that could. did pay taxes (the more profitable
AAA  firms).  And,  most  importantly,  the  governrmen  had  favorable  effects  on  governance  through
indirect channels. Most crucial was the stoppage of open-ended subsidies, which would have destroyed
any leverage other claimholders might have had. By minimizing subsidies, the government created the
possibility for other claimholders to exercise control. And our survey evidence indicates that the other
indirect channel through which the government influenced corporate behavior. the PPWW scheme, did
lead to significant wage restraint, contrary to common views on this issue.
3.2  Banks and Corporare  Governance
The Polish banking system has developed with break neck speed. As latI as 1988,  Poland did20
not have a banking system.  It was not until  1989 that nine banks  were spun off from the National  Bank
of  Poland  (Poland's  mono  bank)-  These  comimercial  banks  were.originally  regional  offices  of  the
communist-era  monobank.  and  were  used  to  dealing.with  SOEs.  There  are  issues  therefore  both  of
banking expertise  and established  relationships  that were bound to impinge on lending decisions.  It was
very much an open question whether these banks would have the ability to restructure  their own portfolios
and  start  playing  a constructive  role in enterprise  transformation  and enterprise  governance.
The system underwent  farreaching  reform  in the fourth  quarter  of  1991 when state banks were
comrmercialized with supervisory  boards and brought under the control of Ministry  of Finance. In October
1991, the MOF  forbade  lending  to some 2000  firms  in trouble.  many of  which were private  firms.  To
check whether  the changes  in the governance  of  banks and  increased  control  implemented  in the last
quarter  of  1991 had any  impact on  their lending  behavior.  we split  up the sample period  into two:  the
nine quarters  89.3-91.3  and the three  quarters  91.4-92.2.
The regressions  run are designed  to answer the question whether  lending  was demand-driven  in
response  to  enterprise  losses or  whether  banks had  prospective  profitability  in mind  in allocating  their
fimds over new loans. The first would be a clear signal that bankus  do noe exercise governance;  the second
case would  be a clear  signal to loss-making  firms  that reform  is necessary  if access to capital markets
were to be mainained;
In the firs  set of regressions  we run bank loans (stock of working  capital plus investment loans)
on  the  profit  margin  and  on  a  measure  of  enterprise  cash  constraints  (cf  Annex  B  for  a  detailed
specification).  The cash constraint  indicainr  is designed as a proxy  for  illiquidity  of the bank's  clients.
The sample is split over  time,  for the reasons  indicated, but all enterprises  are pooled.
The results.  as summarized  in Table  11 and even more so in Table  12. are suggestive.  In the first
period,  prior  to governance  reform  for the. banks themselves,  loans are  strongly  linked to  losses.  The
proft  margin  term  has a strongly  uegative  coefficient  and  is highly  significant.  Over the early  period.
bank loans went  to firms that weXe  not doing well. This  suggests  that over  this period banks played no
role in corporate  governance;  they. simply  %nded enterprise  losses.21
(EMPL)'=+pI3;  ci+i 
Table I1
[  - 0  =  =  |  0  89.3-92.27  89.3-91;3  91.4-92.2
Firm  Estimate  E-stat  Estimae  t-stat  Estinmate  t-stat
Tvpe
All  -0.041  -6.85  -0.030  -5.22  -0-003  -0:65
:-_  0.00001  0.18  -0.00002  -00  -0100001  -0.68 j
BB  Real bank borrowing, nominal BB  deflated by the sectoral PPI'; QuarEerly
nominal BB was computed by averaging monthly stocks in a quarter.-
PRF . Profit margin (Profits over sales).
CC  The cash constraint variable
EMPL: Quarterly employment in a firnm
The story changes after the banking reforms. Running the same regression for the period after
the third quarter greatly reduces the size of the coefficient on profits (by a  factor 10) and generally
produces insignificant coefficients. Clearly the negative link between company profitability and access
to new credit breaks down after the 1991 4  governance reform in the commnercial  bank-s.Table  12
89.3-92.2  89.3-91.3  91.4-92.2
Firm  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-sta|
Type
AAA  13,  -0.025  -2.04  -0.018  -1.55  0.025  1.99
- lt  0.007  1.88  0.006  1.76  -0.003-  -0.82
A  1i,  -0.051  -6-13  -0.037  -5.60  -0.007  -1.56
=-  -0.001  -i.63  -0(0004  -0.63  -0.00003  -0.22
Splitting the sample between type "A" and type "AAA" firms provides further insights on what
is going on (cf Table 12). The same break around 91.4 as we saw in the pooled sample shows up here
too, but much more pronounced: for type "AAA" finms. the coefficient on Drofitability  switches from
significantly negative to significantly  positive; this is a clear indication that banks are starting to exercise
governance.  After the governance  reforms in the banks. profitabiliy  of potential clients apparently  began
to be used as a signal of credirworthiness  rather than as a signal of need. The break is less pronounced
for type 'A"  firms. the coefficient  on profitability in the first half of the sample is highly negative there
too and loses its significance  and size after 91.4. However it does not switch to significantly positive as
in the case of type "AAA" firms.
Similar evidence was obtained from direct survey questions. Managers were asked how difficult
access to credit was for the years 1990 and 1991 and the first six months of 1992 (the tail-end of the
survey period), with the choice of 6 different answer categories ranging from impossible to very easy.
Table 13 lisrs the results of an ordered logit analysis' 2 of the results. The results strongly support the
more indirect analysis based on actual loans extended that we just discussed.
12 A probit  based analysis  gives very similar results  boti  in terms of  size and signis of coefficients and their
significance..23
Ordinal  Logit  for  1990.  1991. and  1992.
Easei,=a+PIAPRFrL+-,(  ABE  1)  +,E
AEMPL 
Table  13
1990  1991  [  1992
Estimate  t stat  Estimate  E stat  Estimate  t s:t
_3  -5.060  -2.196  2.539  0.919  5.771  3.057
A:2  -6.998  0-4306  3.720  0.271  -7.845  -1.166
3.839  1.290  8.502
'Ease"  Ease of obtaining  credit  (scale=  l  to 5;  L most difficult  - 5 very easy); groups  0 and  1 were
joined  to avoid zero  cells..
APRF  : Profit margin  for the whole  year.
ABB  Real stock of bank borrowing  at the end of the year.
AEMPL:  Employment  at the end  of the year.
When running  the equation  for  1990. the ease  of gaining  access  to credit  was inversely  related
to profitability,  which highlights  the bailout function of the financial system immediately  after the demise
of coinununism- But  already  in  1991 the clear negative link between  access to credit and profits  breaks
down:  the coefficient  actually  turns  positive although  it is not significantly  different  from  zero.  But  in
1992. following the banking reforms implemented at the end of 1991 whereby the cornmercial banks were
subject  to the  new  governance  scheme,  the  switch  is clear:  for  1992  profits  are  positively  related  to  the
ease  of obtaining  credit,  and  significantly  so.  An  equally  interesting  result  is  the  complete  lack  of
significance  of lagged  bank  loans:  having  had  access before  apparently  does  not guarantee  continued
access at all.24
Sumzmay  All-in-all  the econometric  analysis of bank lending  provides a very definite  picture. Banks
initially started off playing the role they are usually accused  of: uncritical fundiing  of enterprise losses.
But the strong governance reform in the Polish banks effected by the Polish finance ministry in the last
quarter of 1991 had dramatic results. Come 1992. the econometric evidence strongly supports the view
that commercial banks were letting profitability concerns  guide their decision on credit allocatior. Since
banks are the main source of external finds for enterprises because of the unwillingness  of the Polish
government  to  extend open-ended subsidies, this  development had  a  major  impact on  enterprise
governance.
3.3  Inrer Enterprise arrears
Last in the seniority list of creditors are suppliers. i.e. other enterprises. We tested the same type
of proxies as were used for the banks. The results are somewhat  suggestive but cannot really support any
strong  conclusion given the quality of  the estimates. Profits are a  significantly negative factor in
explaining inter enterprise arrears, something that should not come as a great surprise. And the cash
constraint is not significant  in the first period; one interpretation  could be that no cash constraints existed
over that period. In the second half of the sample  the results change somewhat. The cash constrant proxy
is now borderline significant: and finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on profitability
reduces sharply in size although it keeps its "correct" sign, but loses its statistical significance. AU-in-all,
there is some indication dtat firms shifted towards using more interenterprise arrears as banks tightened
up (recall Table 6); but the econometric evidence is weak.
*NP C  )kt=a+PlPRNi+P 2 CCk+ek
*  EMVPL  2  g  +t25
Table 14
89.3-92.2  89.3-91.3  91.4-92.2
Firm  Estimate  L-stat  Estinate  t-stat  Estimae  t-stat
Type
All  :  -0.014  -3.04  -0.012  -2.04  -0.002  -0.28
-l~ _  -0.00001  -028  0.0004  0.71  0.0001  1.88
NP  net payables (= payables minus receivables), i.e.. inter-firm borrowing
EMPL: Employment
PRF:  Profit margin
CC  Cash Constraint (cf. Annex B).
4  Role Of Managers
In the pre-reformL  socialist era, a manager's worth depended upon the abiliy  to bargain with
cgovernment for  subsidies  and falvored allocations  of  investment  and  input  resources  As  the previous
section showed. those options were by and large foreclosed follr wing the big bang reform program.-
Another big change this program led to was the cost-price squeeze as a result of trade liberalization and
the fixed  exchange rate.-'  SOEs were no  longer able to follow  "cost plus fixed  margin"  pricing  rules,
and were forced to pay attention to efficiency and marketing.
The hardening in the attitude of creditors and government documented  in sections 2 and 3 and
the compression of margins do not by themselves imply good behavior on the part of SOEs. or more
precisely of  their managers. Managerial compensation was not designed to  encourage managers to
:maximize  the long-run  value of the firm.  The legislatively-specified  link between  profits  and bonus  for
The zloty was devalued  substantially  to 9500 per dollar  on January  1. 1990. at which  level it remained  for 17
months  in spite of inflation  of 385 percent  during  this  period.  Some of this inflation  was due to pr.ce-level
adjustment  as domestic  prices  drifted  up to the quality-adjusted  PPP levels implied  bv this  exchange -ate  and
import  prices.  See Pinto. Coriceili and de la Calle (1990) and Wellisz. Kierzkowski  and Okolski (L991).26
1991 is shown in Figure 3. which gives managerial bonus as a function of profits before tax minus
PPWW. At zero profits. the bonus was zero too: and at S 5 million profits. a manager would receive
S2800 for the year. Higher profits than that barely affected the bonus. which asymptotes at S2900 per
annum. This weak link creates a pre-disposition  towards wage awards: but there is nevertheless ample
evidence  (see Section 3) of wage restraint.
M:aagerial  Bonuses
1991
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Fi-gure  3: Managerial Bonuses.
Based on the record of Poland's past failed attempts at reform. managers might have concluded
that the hard budget was temporary. and that any large crisis in the enterprise sector would lead to -a
reinstatement  of tariffs. In the absence of strong positive incentives  towards making the firm profitable.
decapitalizadon  dtrough excessive  wage claims was a distinct possibility, as many economists  feared in
1990. However, the survey evidence  below shows that managers believed  that the reforms were indeed
permanent and that the hard budget constraint  and the end to subsidies  were going to last. This obviously
reduced the incentive for decapitalizaLion;  m case they were thinking of nmining  the enterprises down.
what would they do next for a living?
Table 15 shows managers' responses  to questions on optimism  and the credibility of the reforms.
These questions  were asked in the context of what. in 1992, was believed  to be growing optimism arnong
SOE managers about their ability to operate in the new system. Managers were asked to rank specific27
factors influencing  optimism and the credibiliny  of reforms on a 0-5 scale (0 meaning irrelevant  and 5
high sienificance).
Table 15: Factors Influencing  Optimism  and Credibility
I  Optimism  -AAA  AA|  A
L  Realization  that the government  will nor
help spurs SOEs to look for new
markets  2.8  3.8  317
2. :  r  Two years of market experience  have
boosted self-confidence  3.9  3.4  3 72
Credibility  of Reforms  AAA  AA  A
-L1  Will the goverrnent stay the course?
Yes  24  6  20
No  4  2  3
2.  SOEs in trouble not be bailed out with
subsidies  -3.6  3.7  3.8
I  3  The fiscal deficit be kept under control  3.8  4.7  .3.7
NTote: These questions  were adminiistered  in mid-92. The numbers shown are the average response  on
a 0-5 scale: 0 meaning irrelevant  and 5 meaning  highly significant.
The section on optiLiusm  in Table 15 shows chat  A managers. the ones in the deepest trouble.
realized that no help would be forthcomning  from the government. AAA managers appear to have
benefited  the most from exposure to mark-et  practices. The section on credibility is imteresting  in that
only 9 out of 59 respondents  felt that there would be any sort of dilution in reforms. Further, the
responses  to the undesirability  of re-insta.ting  subsidies  and the importance  of controlling  the fiscal deficit28
are remarkablv  similar among  AAA and A firns.  and both are much closer  to 5 (highly  significant)  than
0 (irrelevant). Managers  invarably emphasized  that unless the deficit were kept low inflation  would  go
up.  making any sort of  planning and budgeting very difficult-.
But the negative  penalties associated with the reform - the PPWW. the mninimum  asset tax
(dividend).  the  compression  of marmins  - were not all that motivated  SOEs  and managers  to respond.  Our
survev indicates  that there wvas  a positive side too. captured  bv the expectation  of rewards at the time of
privatization. Managers by and large expect privanzation. and soon  Only 8 out of 59 responding,
managers felt they would remain SOEs in the near futire:  43 expected  prvatization soon. 5 expected
managerial  contracts for restructuring and 3 were already privatized. WVhen  asked why thev had defied
the ne2ative  stereotypes associated with state companies  and focused on the long-run solvency  of the
companies. managers would initiallv mention emotional reasons. patriotism, and the like: but when
pressed. they all indicated  that they expected  financial  rewards at the time of privatization.  in the form
of stock options as well as retaining  their  jobs as the new CEOs. When  directly  asked whether  they were
concerned  about  establishinge  their reputations  as managers  capable  of operating  in a market  environment.
the answer was invariably: "obviously".
Thus there  seem to have been both carrots and sticks involved in getting managers to improve
the performance  of their enterprises. On the stick side were the hard budget constraits  imposed  by the
Government  (elimination  of subsidies for manufacturing)  and the banks (especially  after the reforms of
1991.4); the fierce import competition:  and the PPWW tax system- On the carrot side were admittedly
implicit  but apparently  still effective  positive inducements  such as the potenial for future cashing  in on
imanaeerial  reputation  and the associated financial  rewards. This suggests that even the anticipation  of
future privatization  already had positive influence  on the performance  of state enterprises. This is in
striking  contradiction  to the assumptions  made in for example  Aghion  and Blanchard  (1993), where SOE
managers  consider  privatization  as the end of their career.
5  Conclusions
The Polish  state sector  has belied  the dire predictions  of most outsiders. Privatization  was  looming
ahead and effective  enterprise control eliminated  after the collapse  of the communist  central authorities
in 1990; in those circumstances.  most (present authors included)  expecrted  the state sector to be headed
for destructive  control  fights and decapitalization  Instead,  state losses  have  been  curbed. SOEs  are behind
Poland's spectacular  export performance  in Westem markers.  and SOEs have made a major contribution
to making Poland Europe's fastest growing economy  in 1993.29
Yet the problems of collapsing central control. lack of effective governance and irrational
management  incenrives  were real. So what is it that made  ihe SOEs perform so well nevertheless?  And
what does it  mean for the design of economic reform programs?  Rapid privatization  was typically
recommended  because  of the very problems  highlighted.  Should  one revisit  this view? The answer is an
emphatic  no: privatzaEion  remains  as important  as was  thought  before.  But the interaction  between  future
privatization and current management incentives in SOEs is much more subtle and less destructive than
some (van Wijubergen  (1991). Aghion  and Blanchard  (1993))  have suggested.
The empirical  evidence  thac  we have presented  here yields a number  of clear conclusions.  First.
key to the good  performance  of state industries  was an end to open-ended  subsidies.  Subsidies,  rather  than
helping SOEs adjust. provide  them with incentives  to continue their past behavior. and. importantly.
destroy any mechanism  of control that other claim holders might have Second, commercial  banLks,  the
Polish experience  shows. can  be made to exercise  governance  over SOEs; but in the absence  of effective
take over mechanisms, withholding  funds is their most powerful instrunent. That instrument is made
powerless  if firms. when faced  with adjustment  pressure  from banks. can  simply  turn to the government
instead-  Banks  themselves  only started to respond  this way after their own  control/incentive  mechanisms
had been reformed, in the fourth quarter  of 1991.  a clear break-point  in most of our econometrc results..
Third, the wage restraint mechanism  (the much criticized "Popiwek' scheme) did contribute  to wage
reStraint  according  to the wage setting equations  presented  here.
The Government  did more. Opening trade forced firms to  focus on costs. efficiency and
marketing  by instantly  introducing  compention  and diluting  any monopoly  power state firms might have
had. The only negative  was  the Govermment's  lax  attitude  to tax arrears.  which of course also undermines
other claim  holders attempts  at exercising  good  governance.  The  damage  that this hole in the  hard budget
consaint  could  cause  was limited, however;  after all tax arrears  cannot  exceed  tax liabilities.  Moreover.
those tax liabilities  are smaller in loss maaking  firms. where the arrears were the most prominent - the
profitable  AAA firms by and large paid taxes on time-
Thus the Polish Goverment, although it has not shown signs of exercising control through its
shareholder function, did create an environrnent  where other claim holders could insist on adjustment
measures. And that is exactly what the most important group among those other claim holders, the
commercial  banks, started  to do once their own incentive  and control  structure  was reformed  towards  the
end of 1991. Before  their own control/incentive  structure was reformed,  banks behaved m the manner
described  by the typical scathing remarks made about them: they channeled  funds to loss makers and
generally  contributed  to soft budget  constraints.  However.  almost immediately  after the banking  reforms30
of the fourth quarter of 1991. their behavior changed radically. Our evidence convincingly  shows that
from the end of 1991 orwards, the commercial  banks re-direcrted  loans to profitable enterprises- As a
consequence.  profitable  enterpnses could expand  and loss makers were forced to contract. This clearlv
indicates  the tremendous but much overlooked  importance  of ownership  reform in commercial  ban;ing
in Eastern Europe. The effects of such reforms in Poland have been spectacular.
Our results show more- Enterprise managers-  indicated their firm belief that privatization  was
coming. Although privatization  plans have been diffuse and their implementation  less than decisive.
managers  expect the process to be inexorablv  headed  towards privatization.  Our interviews  indicate  that
this has led them to manage better. not worse: a private sector-based  economy means a:market for
managers  and thus a reward to good reputation.  Managers  indicated  that their efforts were among other
things inspired  by the hope to profit from future privatization.  either of the firm they  were managing, or
of other firns  as this would in mm lead to a premium on skilled managers.
Thus the standard advice  on the importance  of a credible  and serious privatization  program is in
fact right, the surprizingly good performance  of the Polish state secrtor  notwithstanding.  The subtlety
brought up by the Polish experience  is that such a progr  will have a positive pay-off even before its
completion: the management  of SOEs will improve if managers. by building  up a good track record in
their SOE. position  themselves  better  in any possible  future  market for mana,ger. be that inside or outside
their firm. And a serious privatization  program  is the best way of signaling  that such a market will come
eventually.
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ANNEX  A  The Survey Sample"
The data were collected  by actually  visiting  firms rather than sending  questionnaires  through  the
mail or relying on CSO statistics. The  sample consisted  of 75 large finns scattered  all over Poland-  The
firms were visited in mid-1991  and again in Au  and Sepember 1992.  Information  was collected  for
the three years June 1989  -June 1992,  covering  six months  before  and two-and-a-half  years into Poland's
ETP_ This annex describes  the sample selection  process and the data collected. The enterprises were
chosen from the five biggest  manufacturing  sectors. and are large companies  that would usually  find a.
place in the Lisma  500 (Poland's Fortune  500. the largest companies  based on sales); but giants such as
URSUS. or the biggest  shipyards  and steel mills. were excluded.
The companies  in the sample  incorporate  a high degree  of  product  and geographical  stratification...
They were selected  based on 1989  sales. These firms, being large and highly visible, started out with
similar  initial  conditions  and bargaining  power  vis-a-vis  the government Such  companies  present  the most
difficult  problems  in transforming  and restructuring  stare  manufacturing  because  of their size-and  political
sensitivity-
As our focus is on adjustment  and its causes. we use the same classification  of the 64-  SOEs
responding  to the repeat  survey as in Pinto et alii (1993).  Early in the ETP. profitability  would have  been
a flawed  indicator  of performance  because  various  temporary  factors  -such  as paper  profius  on invenories
and implicit input  subsidies  from CMEA trade  - supported the unsustainable  profits of 1990. However,
by 1992, with such temporarv  distortions  having  vanished.  profits could  be taken as a sign of health  and
even adjustment.
Accordingly,  finns were classified  as follows:
AAA-  positive retained  earnings  (-net  profit) in January-June  1992
AA - positive  pre-tax (=  gross) profit in January-June  1992. but negative  net
profit
A  - negative  pre-tax (=  gross) profit in January-June  :1992.'.
The results were as follows:  31 AAA firms: 8 AA firms:  25 A firns. Tables 1 summarizes  the
characteristics  of these groups. OF  the 64 responding  firms. 3 were privatized.  24 were commercialized
and  37 were still SOEs. Among the 39 AAA and  AA companies. 2 -were pnvatized.  14 were
commercialized  and 23 were SOEs. The least successfiul  A eroup contained,  a significant  number of
comuercialized firms, indicating  either that more time is needed  before a change  in govemance  has an
impact:  or that a change in governance  does not guarantee  improved  financia!  performance.
14  See Pinto et alii (1993) for more  details.
Net profit is retained  earnings  after paying  corporate  income tax. the dividend  -a misnomer  for a minimum  asset
tax paid to te  governmenE  - and excess wage  tax (PPWW). Gross profit is pre-ax profiL See Pinm eti lii (1993)
fir  complete  definitions  of these  terms. which  confirm to Polish accounting  conventions.34
Table A. Characteristics  of Sample Enterprises
_______--__-__|__-_  Category t -'-  -'  I  .
Characteristic  A  AA  AAA
Average Sales  55  99  103
Average  Employment'  3300  2890  2939
Sectoral Origin
Metallurgy  4  4  5
Electromachinerv  5  1  5
Chemicals  21  10
Light,  1  3
Manufacturing  - 3  8
Food  Processing  -
Governance  I  2
Privatized  10  1  13
Commercialized  - 14  7.  16
State-Owned
Semi-finshed steel  Raw and semi-  Processed ferrous
Main Products  products. raw steel.  processed steel  and non-ferrous
processed steel  products. steel  products:
products - small  pipes, fertilizers.  refrigerators;
amount. means of  rneat products.  ovens: heavy
passenger road  sugar.  engines:
transportation.  transformers:
trailers, machine  wires and cables.
tools, construction  paints and
equipment. man  varnishes; tires:
made fibers.  fertilizer: floor
plastics. hosiery.  tiles; finished
shoes. textiles,  garments:
threads. woolen  cigarettes: sweets
threads.  sugar.  and chocolates:
l________________  processed  meat.
:  Category is based on financial performance  from January-June 1992
Average sales are in millions of dollars for 1991
Average Employment is measured as of June 1992-
Polish SOEs have been operating with limited or no interference  from the Ministry of Industry.
They are "self-governing"  under the direction of a Workers' Council that hires and fires the manager,
determines managerial compensation  and clears all important strategic and even operating decisions. As35
a rule. SOEs have not received  any special treatment  or financial  subsidy  during the ETP. In addition  to
the rigors of hard budgets and import competition,  SOEs have been subject to the dividend,  actually a
miniimum  asset tax on the centrally  financed  share-of  the company's equity, and the excess wage tax, a
penalty on wage increases  above specified norms that in 1990  carried a punishing  500% marginal  tax
rate.
Commercialized  companies  differ  in two ways  from SOEs: first. instead  of the Workers'  Council,
there is a Supervisory Board, of which four members are nominated  by the Ministry of Privatization
(MOP) and two by the employees:  second. the enterprise is transferred to the control of the MOP and
on paper, nust be privatized in two years. Further. comrnercialized  firms were to be exempt from the
fixed dividend and pay a percentage  of after-tax  profits to the Treasury instead: and were to receive a
break of 20 percent on excess wage tax payments. These tax breaks induced several SOEs to seek
commercialization  at the end of 1990;  but the tax breaks have proved elusive. The dividend  tax rate was
reduced from 32  percent in  1990 to 22 percent in 1991 and subsequently to  10 percent in July  1992,
while the dividend from comrmercialized  companies  was re-assessed  as a form of asset tax. The highest
marginal  excess wage tax rate has been lowered  to 300 percent and the capacity  to exceed norm wages
has diminished  along  with enterprise  profitability  and iiquidity.  The enthusiasm  for commercialization  has
waned along with the tax advantages:
Over our  sample period, there is  little to choose in  practical terms between SOEs and
commercialized  firms. In well-run SOEs. the defacto  balance of power has shifted in favor of the
manager, not surprising in view of the scarcity of manaeerial  talent in Poland and the rising fear of
unemployment. [n addition most firms were commercialized  in mid-1991, leaving only one year of
sample performance. inadequate  to trace the impact of commercialization.  Therefore, the main text
discusses  governance  more in terms of the role of the government  and banks.36
ANNEX B  Banks and Corporate Governance
Assume  wage maximization.  This means  that the following accounting  inequality  must hold if tax
arrears do not arise:
(i)  (GVA - W - D) (l-t)  + D - Ž  t PPWW.
where GVA is gross-value added. W is the wage bill grossed up to  include payroll taxes. social
insurance. etc..  D is depreciation, t  is  the corporate income tax  rate (t  =  40%),  5 is the dividend
(minimum  asset tax), and PPWW is the excess wage tax, which depends upon W in relation to the norm
wages.
If wages  are set to exhaust the surplus, then (i) must hold with equality. This can be re-arranged
to give
GVA(1-t) +  tD -6  =  W(1-t)  +  PPWW.
We can thus use the ratio (W(1-t) + PPWW)I(GVA(l-t) + tD -5) as a cash constraint indicator.
which is denoted CC. If bank loans are highly correlated with CC. this would indicate budget softness.
The following  regression was estimated:
BB/EMPL  =  f( PRF  CC),
where BB is bank loans (the stock of working capital plus investment loans deflated by the relevant
sectoral PPI),  EMPL is employment, a proxy for firm-size. PRF is profit margin and CC is the cash
constraint indicator  just defined.' 6 If the coefficient  on CC is positive and that on PRF is negative,  this
would be overwhelming  evidence of soft bank loans: and proof chat  the really profitable  companies did
*  not want to borrow.
The reason  for using the stock of loans is two-fold:  first. mnost  of the quarterly variaton is in working capital
loans:  second.  such  loans  are  essentially  short-term  loans. renegotiated  with  the  banks  every  few  months.Policy  Research  Working  -Paper  Series
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